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Introduction	In	contemporary	Yezidi	discourse,	violence	has	a	cyclical	character,	in	contrast	to	interpretations	of	history	that	posit	the	progressively	declining	role	of	violence	in	human	affairs.1	A	sense	of	historical	victimhood	is	central	to	the	formation	of	Yezidis	communal	identity	whose	very	survival	was	at	stake	in	different	time	periods.	Accordingly,	the	IS	attacks	in	2014	were	perceived	as	the	latest	in	a	series	of	atrocities	Yezidis	experienced	since	the	medieval	times.	The	attacks	are	called	“the	74rd	firman”	implying	continuity	with	previous	episodes	of	mass	scale	violence	targeting	the	community.	While	the	IS	attacks	involving	mass	executions	and	enslavement	shocked	the	conscience	of	the	international	community,	for	Yezidis,	the	tragedy	of	August	2014	was	not	unprecedented	in	terms	of	its	harm.	In	the	words	of	a	Yezidi	leader,	“[In	1832],	[t]hey	took	away	a	thousand	of	our	girls.	A	thousand	was	plenty.	Our	population	was	much	smaller	by	that	…You	now	see	lots	of	[Sunni]	Kurds	around.	Their	fourth	or	fifth	generation	ancestors	were	Yezidis.”2	In	his	eyes,	Yezidis	have	historically	been	targeted	because	of	their	religious	beliefs	and	subject	to	sexual	violence	and	forced	conversions.	The	main	difference	between	the	past	massacres	and	the	current	one	was	the	widespread	publicity	characterizing	the	IS	violence	that	triggered	an	international	humanitarian	intervention,	which	was	in	fact	unprecedented.			 This	prevailing	discourse	of	victimhood	implies	that	Yezidis	were	subject	to	violent	campaigns	primarily	due	to	their	religious	identity.	In	fact,	Orthodox	Islamic	perspectives	define	Yazidis	as	polytheists	or	unbelievers	and	do	not	treat	them	as	“People	of	the	Book,”	unlike	Christians	and	Jews	who	are	entitled	to	certain	rights	and	a	limited	degree	of	autonomy	in	their	internal	affairs.	This	liminal	status,	similar	to	the	experience	of	other	religious	groups	that	emerged	after	the	rise	of	Islam	such	as	Alevis,	Kakais,	and	Bahais,	put	Yezidis	in	a	precarious	position	and	more	vulnerable	to	violence	justified	on	religious	
 2 
grounds	over	centuries	from	the	fatwas	of	the	leading	Ottoman	jurist	Ebu's-suud	in	the	16th	century	to	the	IS	in	the	21st	century.	From	this	perspective,	the	very	existence	of	Yezidis	as	a	non-Islamic	group	has	been	a	source	of	major	security	concern	and	religious	challenge	to	the	political	order	in	Muslim	societies.	While	the	rise	of	political	secularism	with	the	formation	of	the	Iraqi	national	state	provided	a	semblance	of	stability	for	Yezidis,	the	post-2003	period	was	characterized	by	the	collapse	of	the	state	authority	and	violent	sectarianism	signified	the	return	of	religious	violence	targeting	Yezidis	qua	Yezidis.			 This	chapter	suggests	that	the	IS	attacks	of	2014,	which	exhibits	certain	similarities	with	the	past	violence,	has	had	unique	implications	for	Yezidis.	The	contemporary	forms	of	Yezidi	identity	exhibit	two	distinctive	characteristics	in	the	post-genocidal	era.	First,	Yezidis	have	gained	unprecedented	recognition	and	interest	in	the	international	arena.	While	Yezidis	had	a	long	history	of	contacts	with	Western	diplomats,	scholars,	and	travelers	going	back	to	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century,	the	community	as	the	victims	of	religious	intolerance	and	persecution	brought	the	community	under	global	limelight	in	the	post-2014	period.	In	particular,	captive	Yezidi	women	subject	to	extreme	forms	of	sexual	violence	have	come	to	embody	the	experience	of	the	community.	This	gendered	experience	facilitated	a	context	for	Yezidi	women	to	express	their	perspectives	and	become	vocal	voices,	such	as	Nadia	Murad,	to	communicate	the	experiences	of	the	Yazidis	to	the	international	community	and	make	political	demands.	Given	the	long	history	of	entrenched	patriarchal	practices	in	the	community,	the	increased	visibility	of	Yazidi	women	and	their	increased	engagement	with	issues	that	affect	their	community	represents	a	paradoxical	outcome	of	the	IS	violence.		Next,	the	massive	displacement	suffered	by	the	community	contributed	to	the	fragmented	nature	of	Yezidi	politics.	This	process	of	fragmentation	has	taken	place	at	two	parallel	levels.	On	the	one	hand,	Yezidis	are	subject	to	the	authority	of	an	increasing	number	of	political	actors	with	opposing	agendas.	The	failure	and	inability	of	the	Kurdish	military	forces	to	protect	the	Sinjar	area	against	the	IS	onslaught	in	early	August	2014	generated	sentiments	of	disillusionment	and	resentment	among	large	sections	of	the	Yezidi	community.	This	development	drew	a	wedge	between	the	Yezidis	and	Sunni	Kurds	despite	their	common	linguistic	characteristics.	Even	if	the	Kurdistan	Regional	Government	(KRG)	pursues	a	policy	of	co-optation	and	symbolic	empowerment	towards	the	Yezidis,	the	
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debacle	of	August	2014	has	had	a	strong	negative	impact	over	the	popular	appeal	of	a	hyphenated	identity	of	“Yezidi-Kurds.”	Meanwhile,	the	rise	of	the	PKK	as	a	significant	military	force	in	the	Sinjar	area	and	the	capture	of	most	parts	of	the	Sinjar	by	the	Iraqi	government	and	Shiite	militias	led	to	the	proliferation	of	political	forces.	On	the	other	hand,	there	has	been	a	notable	increase	in	the	number	of	Yezidis	who	claim	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	community	and	pursue	different	goals	both	in	Iraq	and	Western	countries.	Ironically,	the	relative	demographic	and	political	weakness	of	the	Yezidi	community	has	contributed	to	its	political	fragmentation,	as	different	Yezidis	seek	the	support	of	a	variety	of	local	and	international	entities.			 The	chapter	first	offers	a	historical	overview	of	the	Yezidis’	interactions	with	local	and	imperial	rulers	since	the	rise	of	the	community	with	its	distinctive	religious	belief	system	by	the	13th	century.	Yezidis	always	remained	outsiders	to	the	Ottoman	millet	system	offering	limited	tolerance	and	autonomy	to	non-Islamic	groups	such	as	Christians	and	Jews.	At	the	same	time,	large-scale	military	campaigns	targeting	Yezidis	were	not	exclusively	or	primarily	religiously	motivated.	The	Ottoman	pashas	led	many	expeditions	against		Mt.	Sinjar	inhabited	by	several	Yezidi	tribes	primarily	in	order	to	protect	the	caravan	routes	linking	northern	Syria	and	southeastern	Anatolia	with	Mesopotamia.	With	the	advent	of	the	19th	century,	Yezidis	became	targets	of	Ottoman	centralization	efforts	aiming	at	tax	collection	and	conscription	that	continued	after	the	establishment	of	the	Iraqi	state	in	the	1920s.	Next	is	a	narrative	of	the	violence	experienced	by	the	Yezidis	in	the	post-2003	era.	The	general	atmosphere	of	sectarian	insecurity	and	rise	of	radical	Islamist	groups	have	made	Yezidis	more	dependent	on	the	KRG	that	perceived	the	Yezidi	community	as	an	important	leverage	in	its	claims	over	disputed	territories	in	the	province	of	Nineveh.	However,	the	IS	blitzkrieg	in	2014	undermined	this	dependency	and	exposed	the	vulnerability	of	Yezidis	lacking	a	defense	force	of	their	own.	The	remaining	sections	of	the	chapter	focuses	on	the	rise	of	an	ethnoreligious	national	identity	in	intersection	with	gender	identity	among	Yezidis	amid	political	fragmentation	in	the	post-genocidal	period.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	brief	reflection	on	the	future	evolution	of	Yezidi	politics.		
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A	Liminal	Existence:	Yezidis	under	the	Ottomans		Yezidism,	primarily	a	set	of	beliefs	and	practices	transmitted	orally	across	generations,	has	an	inherent	tendency	to	defy	orthodoxy	associated	with	religions	with	a	history	of	extensive	records.	As	eloquently	articulated	by	Philip	Kreyenbroek,	no	dogmatic	and	official	form	of	the	faith	exists.	The	pursuit	of	defining	Yezidism	according	an	authoritative	and	canonical	textual	source	overlooks	oral	traditions	central	to	its	lived	experience.3	Unlike	Mandeans	who	claimed	to	have	sacred	books	of	their	own,	probably	to	escape	persecution	in	the	hands	of	powerful	Muslim	rulers,	Yezidi	went	to	lenghts	to	hide	their	purported	books	from	outsiders.4	Nonetheless,	the	attempt	to	identify	the	textual	origins	of	Yezidism	has	been	a	major	occupation	of	both	Western	and	Muslim	travelers,	scholars,	and	intellectuals	who	often	perceived	the	community	as	an	exotic	group	with	strange	and	arcane	customs	for	an	extended	period	time.5	In	particular,	the	widespread	usage	of	the	epithet	of	“devil-worshippers,”	which	conflates	the	sacred	status	of	Peacock	Angel	for	Yezidis	as	an	affront	to	the	Muslim	God,	suggests	that	the	community	remained	illegible	for	outside	observers	for	centuries.6			 The	Yezidis	remained	an	illegible	community	in	the	eyes	of	Ottoman	rulers	who	established	their	dominance	over	territories	inhabited	by	Yazidis	in	the	early	16th	century.	At	the	same	time	far	from	being	defenseless	and	helpless	subjects,	Yezidis	were	autonomous	political	actors	with	significant	capacity	for	coalition-building,	negotiation,	and	resistance.	There	are	numerous	records	of	Yezidi	tribal	chiefs	being	appointed	as	local	Ottoman	rulers	and	engaging	in	alliances	with	or	against	Sunni	tribal	chiefs.7	The	community	presented	two	overlapping	but	distinct	challenges	to	the	Ottoman	order.	First,	Ottoman	rulers	perceived	Mt.	Sinjar,	an	arid	and	narrow	mountain	range	with	commanding	views	of	the	trade	routes	between	Baghdad	and	Mosul,	in	the	southeast,	and	Aleppo,	Diyarbakir,	Mardin	in	the	northwest,	as	a	bastion	of	insecurity	and	banditry.8	They	organized	a	series	of	punitive	expeditions	against	Yezidi	tribes	who	engaged	in	raids	targeting	caravans.	For	instance,	Evliya	Çelebi,	the	renowned	Ottoman	traveler,	was	an	observer	in	such	an	expedition	in	1655.	He	described	Yezidis	of	Sinjar	as	“wild	savages,	rebellious,	ghoul	faced,	hairy	infidels”	who	worshiped	a	black	dog.9	He	also	narrates	a	
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previous	expedition	by	the	ruler	of	Diyarbakir	in	1640	resulted	in	massacres	and	enslavement	of	thousands	of	Yezidis.10		Evliya	Çelebi’s	dehumanization	of	Yezidis	was	not	untypical	and	pointed	out	to	a	second	dynamic	characterizing	the	Ottoman-Yezidi	relations.	Yezidis	with	their	“illegitimate”	belief	system	remained	outside	of	the	Ottoman	moral	order.	Even	if	the	campaigns	against	Mt.	Sinjar	were	often	motivated	by	security	concerns	(i.e.,	securing	the	caravan	routes	and	recovering	stolen	goods),	large	scale	and	indiscriminate	violence	against	Yezidis	were	justified	on	religious	grounds.11	In	this	regard,	it	is	possible	to	draw	parallels	between	the	Ottoman	state’	perception	of	Sinjar	and	the	Ottoman	and	later	Turkish	state’s	perceptions	of	Dersim	in	eastern	Anatolia.12		Using	the	concept	developed	by	James	Scott,	these	two	mountain	ranges	with	their	natural	defenses	against	invading	forces	can	be	described	as	stateless	zones	with	a	long	history	of	indigenous	people	resisting	or	fleeing	state	authorities,	Yezidis	in	Sinjar	and	Zazaki	speaking	Alevis	in	Dersim.13	In	both	cases,	the	state	authorities	perceived	as	these	regions	as	a	stateless	zone	inhabited	by	a	group	whose	“deviant”	religious	beliefs	foster	disloyalty	and	make	them	potentially	rebellious.14	The	history	of	Ottoman-Yezidi	interactions	during	the	last	century	of	the	Empire	demonstrates	several	tendencies	shaping	the	imperial	policies	and	priorities.	The	advent	Ottoman	modernization	of	the	19th	century	involved	the	imposition	of	conscription,	improvements	in	tax	collection,	and	projection	of	central	state	authority	into	remote	corners	of	the	empire.	Meanwhile,	the	Russo-Turkish	wars,	especially	the	conflict	in	1877,	resulted	in	thousands	of	Yezidi	being	subjects	of	the	Russian	Empire.15		The	1830s	and	1840s	saw	a	series	of	campaigns	against	Sinjar	that	remained	a	geopolitically	important	area	controlling	the	line	of	communication	between	Diyarbakir	and	Mosul.16	A	permanent	Turkish	garrison	in	the	more	accessible	southern	Sinjar	was	established	only	after	1849.17	At	the	same	time,	the	Ottomans	were	less	successful	in	conscripting	Yezidis.18	After	the	powerful	British	Ambassador	in	the	Ottoman	capital	intervened	on	their	behalf,	Yezidis	of	Sheikhan	and	Sinjar	were	able	to	obtain	an	exemption	in	1850.19	In	a	petition	submitted	to	the	Ottoman	authorities	and	representatives	of	European	powers,	Yezidi	leaders	demanded	exemption	from	obligatory	military	service	on	religious	grounds.	This	was	the	first	time	Yezidis	presented	a	stylized	version	of	their	belief	systems	to	the	outside	world	in	a	written	
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document.	Even	if	the	Ottoman	state	continued	to	treat	Yezidis	as	a	liminal	minority	not	qualified	to	be	included	in	the	millet	system,	it	also	showed	flexibility	and	accepted	that	Yezidis	made	a	payment	in	lieu	of	serving	in	the	Ottoman	army.		Religious	considerations	became	more	central	to	how	the	Ottoman	state	dealt	with	the	Yezidis	during	the	reign	of	Abdülhamid	II.	The	project	of	making	loyal	subjects	out	of	Yezidis	involved	systematic	attempts	at	their	conversion	at	a	time	when	increasing	presence	of	foreign	representations	and	missionaries	in	the	eastern	provinces	aggravated	the	threat	perception	of	the	Ottoman	state.	The	conscription	of	Yezidis	would	facilitate	their	Islamization,	and	make	them	immune	to	the	appeal	of	foreign	influences,	and	ensure	their	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	order.	An	Ottoman	Pasha	entrusted	with	the	task	of	dealing	with	the	“Yezidi	question”	who	arrived	in	Mosul	in	1892	engaged	in	a	campaign	of	terror	and	destruction	that	ultimately	backfired.	Hundreds	of	Yezidis	were	killed,	the	Lalish,	the	spiritual	center	of	Yezidis,	was	converted	to	a	madrasa,	sacred	religious	objects	were	confiscated,	mosques	were	built	in	Yezidi	villages,	leading	figures	of	the	community	were	forced	to	convert.20	When	the	word	of	these	coercive	practices	reached		the	Ottoman	capital,	the	pasha	was	dismissed.	Apparently,	the	Ottoman	state	did	not	approve	pasha’s	brutal	methods	that	sow	disorder	and	insecurity	in	the	region	and	recognized	the	limits	of	violence	in	achieving	mass	conversion.21	The	remaining	decades	of	the	Ottoman	era	did	not	see	any	large	anti-Yezidi	violence	except	for	brief	expeditions	against	Sinjar	during	World	War	I.	Overall,	this	historical	overview	offers	a	nuanced	picture	of	Yezidi	victimhood	under	the	Ottomans.	While	religious	violence	against	Yezidis,	a	heterodox	group	excluded	from	the	legitimate	Ottoman	intercommunal	system,	became	salient	in	certain	time	periods,	the	community	developed	a	strong	sense	of	political	autonomy	and	often	achieved	significant	concessions	via	resistance	or	negotiations.		
In	the	Crossfire:	The	Formation	of	Yezidi	Political	Identity	in	Post-2003	Iraq		During	the	Mosul	dispute	between	the	nascent	Turkish	Republic	and	the	British	controlled	Iraq,	most	Yezidi	leaders	preferred	Iraq	under	a	European	mandate	over	a	Turkish	or	Arab	government.22	Nonetheless,	Yezidis	remained	on	the	margins	of	the	newly	established	Iraqi	state.	Conscription	continued	to	be	a	major	concern	for	the	community	and	triggered	small	scale	acts	of	rebellion	in	Sinjar,	which	gained	a	new	geopolitical	importance	as	a	border	
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zone	between	Syria	and	Iraq.23	Ironically,	the	marginal	political	influence	of	Yezidis	could	be	a	major	reason	for	the	absence	of	large-scale	violence	targeting	the	community	in	Iraq	during	the	20th	century.24	Nonetheless,	the	rising	appeal	of	Kurdish	nationalism	among	Yezidis	starting	with	the	early	1960s	led	to	repressive	policies	by	the	Baghdad	governments.25	The	ruling	Ba’th	regime	initiated	a	systematic	campaign	of	resettlement	and	Arabization	targeting	the	Sinjar	region.26	Yezidis	of	the	mountain	villages	were	forced	to	relocate	to	11	collective	settlements	surrounded	by	Arab	villages	receiving	preferential	treatment.27	In	the	1980s,	a	significant	number	of	Yezidis	served	in	the	Iraqi	army	and	lost	their	lives	in	the	war	with	Iran.	In	the	early	1990s,	the	establishment	of	an	internationally	enforced	no-fly	zone	and	the	formation	of	de	facto	Kurdish	autonomy	saw	the	partition	of	Yezidi	lands	between	Baghdad	and	Erbil.	While	the	Sinjar	area	and	southern	Sheikhan	remained	under	the	Iraqi	rule,	Yezidi	communities	in	Dohuk,	other	parts	of	Sheikhan	district,	and	the	Lalish	temple	fall	under	the	Kurdish	control.		In	the	post-2003	order,	Yezidis	became	a	crucial	demographic	bloc	to	KRG’s	claims	over	disputed	territories	and	its	power	politics	in	the	Nineveh	province,	one	of	the	most	contested	areas	in	the	entire	country.	In	the	2005	referendum	on	the	new	Iraqi	constitution,	around	55	percent	of	the	voters	said	no	in	the	Nineveh	province	that	also	includes	Sinjar.	This	was	still	short	of	the	two-thirds	of	the	vote	that	would	result	in	the	defeat	of	the	new	constitution.28	Since	the	Kurds	were	the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	new	constitutional	order,	obtaining	the	Yezidi	support	in	Nineveh	was	essential	to	their	political	goals.	Article	2	of	the	constitution	drafted	in	2006	and	passed	in	the	KRG	parliament	in	2009	included	Sinjar	as	part	of	Iraqi	Kurdistan.	Yezidis,	who	were	subject	to	Arabization	policies	during	the	Saddam	era,	also	benefited	from	the	Kurdish	patronage.	For	the	first	time,	Sinjar	district	had	a	Yezidi	governor.	Some	Yezidis	joined	the	Iraqi	army	or	Peshmerga	and	worked	as	translators	for	the	US	army.	Other	Yezidis	found	employment	opportunities	in	Dohuk	and	Erbil	and	benefited	from	the	Kurdish	economic	boom	that	lasted	until	2014.29	These	developments	generated	some	resentment	among	the	Sunni	Arabs	and	Turkomans	in	the	area	who	lost	their	privileged	positions	and	increasingly	perceived	the	Yezidis	as	being	part	of	the	Kurdish	power	structure.30	At	the	same	time,	a	significant	number	of	Yezidis	were	uncomfortable	with	the	rising	ethnic	tensions	and	Kurdish	exclusion	and	repression	of	Yezidis	political	activism	espousing	an	independent	
 8 
communal	identity.	They	were	fearful	that	their	community	was	becoming	pawns	in	the	Kurdish-Arab	territorial	struggle	and	characterized	the	KRG	policies	as	“Kurdification”	of	Sinjar.31		Like	other	religious	minorities	in	Iraq,	the	fall	of	the	Saddam	regime	in	2003	generated	an	atmosphere	that	was	highly	dangerous	for	Yezidis.	As	early	as	2004,	targeted	killings	of	Yezidis	because	of	their	religious	identity	started	to	proliferate.32	It	became	increasingly	dangerous	for	Yezidis	to	get	services,	work	or	study	at	Mosul,	which	emerged	as	a	hotbed	of	Sunni	militant	groups.33	The	self-proclaimed	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	(ISI)	imposed	a	siege	on	the	delivery	of	food,	fuel,	and	construction	materials	to	Sinjar	as	it	considered	Yezidis	unbelievers.34	After	a	Yezidi	girl	was	stoned	to	death	her	relatives	and	community	for	allegedly	having	an	affair	with	a	Sunni	man	in	April	2007,	the	ISI	urged	its	followers	to	kill	Yezidis	wherever	they	find	them.	Two	weeks	later,	armed	men	stopped	a	bus,	checked	passengers’	identification	documents,	and	ordered	non-Yezidis	off	the	bus.	Then	they	drove	the	hijacked	bus	to	Mosul	and	executed	23	Yezidis	there.35	The	most	lethal	terrorist	attack	in	post-2003	Iraq,	suicide	bombings	in	Al-Qahtaniya	(Girzerik)	and	Al-Jazeera	(Siba	Sheikh	Xidir)	collective	towns	inhabited	by	Yezidis,	killed	several	hundreds	of	people	on	August	14,	2007.36			 These	developments	made	Yezidis	of	Sinjar	more	dependent	on	the	Kurdish	authorities	for	their	security	who	increased	their	control	of	the	area	especially	after	the	2007	bombings.	Between	2005	and	2009,	Kurdish	parties	increased	their	vote	share	at	the	expense	of	autonomous	Yezidi	parties	in	Sinjar.	While	the	Kurdish	Alliance	received	44,224	votes	(approximately	60	percent	of	the	valid	votes),	the	Yezidi	Movement	for	Reform	and	Progress	received	17,055	votes	(app.	22	percent)	in	the	Sinjar	district	and	Qahtaniya	subdistrict	in	the	December	2005	parliamentary	elections.37	In	comparison,	the	Kurdish	alliance	received	101,606	votes	(app.	78	percent)	while	two	autonomous	Yezidi	parties	received	only	7,787	votes	(app.	6	percent)	in	the	January	2009	provincial	elections.38	By	that	time,	the	Yezidi	support	for	the	Kurdish	political	goals	in	Nineveh	became	even	more	important	as	the	Sunni	Arabs	now	started	to	actively	participate	in	the	electoral	politics.		At	the	same	time,	the	KRG	authorities	do	not	recognize	Yezidis	as	a	distinct	ethnoreligious	group	but	as	ethnic	Kurds	with	distinct	religious	beliefs.	In	the	eyes	of	KRG	leaders,	Yezidism	is	the	“original	Kurdish	religion”	that	set	Kurds	historically	apart	from	
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Arabs,	Persians,	and	Turks,	their	Muslim	neighbors	Muslim	populations.	In	this	regard,	Yezidism	was	incorporated	into	the	Kurdish	nationalist	discourse.39	Article	6	of	the	draft	KRG	constitution	explicitly	mentions	only	Turkomans,	Chaldeans,	Assyrians,	Armenians,	and	Arabs	as	distinct	national	groups.	Article	7	states	that	the	Islamic	law	is	one	of	the	sources	of	legislation	while	indicating	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	Christians	and	Yezidis	and	other	religions	are	to	be	protected.40	The	KRG	parliament	has	111	seats	with	11	of	these	seats	reserved	for	Chaldeans,	Assyrians,	Armenians,	and	Turkomans	and	none	for	Yezidis.41			In	summary,	the	fall	of	the	Saddam	regime	had	a	mixed	blessing	for	the	Yezidis.	On	the	one	hand,	there	was	an	improvement	in	the	material	well-being	of	the	Yezidis	in	the	post-2003	era.	Some	Yezidis,	especially	the	ones	serving	in	the	Iraqi	army	or	working	for	the	U.S.	army,	improved	their	economic	situation,	built	themselves	houses	and	purchased	cars.42	Moreover,	Yezidis	affiliated	with	the	KDP,	the	dominant	party	in	the	KRG,	gained	access	to	greater	political	patronage	and	resources.	On	the	other	hand,	the	rise	of	sectarian	extremism	made	the	situation	of	Yezidis,	a	historically	marginalized	community,	even	more	precarious.		They	were	disproportionately	targeted	by	extremist	groups	and	became	increasingly	dependent	on	the	Kurdish	Peshmerga	for	their	very	survival.	Besides,	the	KRG’s	attempts	to	reconstruct	Yezidi	identity	by	emphasizing	its	common	linkages	with	Kurdishness	generated	some	backlash	among	Yezidis	of	Sinjar	who	were	fearful	that	increasing	ethnic	conflict	over	disputed	territories	in	Nineveh	would	result	in	their	scapegoating.		
An	Ethnoreligious	National	Identity?	In	the	early	hours	of	August	3,	2014,	the	so-called	Islamic	State	(IS),	which	already	captured	Mosul	and	the	surrounding	areas	in	less	than	two	months	ago,	staged	a	coordinated	attack	against	the	Sinjar	region.	As	the	Kurdish	forces	withdrew	in	panic,	the	IS	quickly	overrun	any	feeble	defense	shown	in	Yezidi	collective	towns.	During	this	campaign,	at	least	1,500	Yazidis	were	executed	while	almost	1,500	died	on	Mt.	Sinjar	from	dehydration	or	starvation.43	Around	6,400	Yazidis,	mostly	women	and	children,	were	kidnapped.	Many	of	them	were	subsequently	sold	as	“slaves”	by	IS.44	Women	were	raped	repeatedly;	children	were	forced	to	convert	and	brainwashed	to	serve	as	soldiers	for	the	IS.	Although	other	religious	minority	groups	in	northern	Iraq	were	also	targeted	by	IS,	the	
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scale	of	anti-Yazidi	violence	was	unparalleled.	Testimonies	by	survivors	suggest	that	many	local	Muslims,	including	former	friends,	“blood	brothers,”	and	godfathers	of	Yezidi	children,	took	an	active	part	in	the	killings	and	kidnappings.	Accordingly,	most	killings	and	kidnappings	took	place	in	towns	such	as	Siba	Sheik	Xidir,	Girzerik,	and	Kocho	that	were	close	to	Arab	settlements.45	Yezidis	in	the	northern	part	of	the	mountain	had	more	time	to	take	refuge	in	Mt.	Sinjar.46	The	IS	control	of	the	Sinjar	city	center	ended	in	November	2015;	the	entire	Sinjar	district	was	liberated	by	spring	2017.	Yet	the	scope	of	destruction,	poisoned	intercommunal	relations,	and	prevailing	political	instability	have	prevented	reconstruction	efforts.	Five	years	after	the	attacks,	most	Yezidis	of	Sinjar	either	stayed	in	IDP	camps	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan	or	sought	refuge	in	Western	countries.47				 This	catastrophic	development	had	a	monumental	impact	on	Yezidi	political	identity	and	had	three	specific	consequences.	First,	for	the	first	time	in	their	history,	Yezidis	emerged	as	a	political	community	attracting	significant	international	interest	and	concern.	The	Obama	Administration’s	decision	to	authorize	airstrikes	against	the	IS	was	triggered	by	the	human	tragedy	experienced	by	the	Yezidis	stranded	on	Mt.	Sinjar.48	International	organizations	including	the	United	Nations	described	the	anti-Yezidi	attacks	as	genocide.49	A	Yezidi	survivor	woman,	Nadia	Murad,	became	the	co-recipient	of	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize	in	2018	for	her	global	activism	against	sexual	violence	in	war.	The	German	federal	state	of	Baden	Württemberg	initiated	a	humanitarian	admission	program	specifically	forYezidi	women	survivors	and	their	children	(but	not	necessarily	adult	male	members	of	their	family).50	While	it	would	take	some	years	to	fully	assess	its	effects,	this	global	spread	of	the	community	led	to	the	diversification	and	internationalization	of	Yezidi	activism	with	the	formation	of	various	associations	by	Yezidis	based	in	Western	countries.51	With	support	from	various	international	actors,	these	associations	have	made	two	core	demands	influenced	by	political	liberalism	and	transitional	justice	discourses:	(a)	the	recognition	of	the	IS	attacks	against	Yezidis	as	genocide	and	(b)	the	formation	of	international	tribune	to	try	and	convict	individuals	who	participated	in	these	attacks.	The	fact	that	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	does	not	have	automatic	jurisdiction	over	Iraq	and	Syria,	which	are	not	part	of	the	Rome	treaty	of	2002	that	created	the	ICC,	complicated	these	efforts.52	The	captured	IS	militants	were	tried	in	Iraqi	courts	where	many	of	whom	found	guilty	and	sentenced	to	death.	Thousands	of	IS	fighters	from	many	different	countries	were	detained	
 11 
by	PYD	forces	in	northern	Syria	after	the	liberation	of	the	last	piece	of	land	held	by	the	IS	in	March	2019.	Yet	not	a	single	IS	member	was	put	on	trial	for	crimes	specifically	committed	against	Yezidi	people.53		Another	important	consequence	of	the	IS	attacks	on	Yezidi	political	identity	is	the	strained	links	between	Yezidis	and	the	KRG.	As	indicated	before,	the	KRG	established	political	and	military	control	over	Yezidi	inhabited	territories	and	extensive	patronage	networks	incorporating	a	large	number	of	Yezidis	between	2003	and	2014.	However	the	panicked	withdrawal	of	the	Kurdish	forces	from	Sinjar	in	August	2014	was	a	major	disappointment.	While	some	Yezidis	argued	that	the	Kurdish	forces	lacked	the	capacity	to	resist	against	the	IS	onslaught,	many	others	portrayed	the	withdrawal	as	an	act	of	betrayal	demonstrating	the	dispensability	of	Yezidis	for	the	Kurdish	leadership.54	In	response,	the	KRG	authorities	undertook	several	initiatives	including	the	establishment	of	an	office	responsible	for	rescuing	Yezidis	kidnapped	by	the	IS	and	diplomatic	efforts	aiming	to	have	the	anti-Yezidi	attacks	recognized	as	genocide.55		The	term	genocide	evokes	a	strong	emotional	and	political	meanings	for	Iraqi	Kurds	given	the	legacy	of	Saddam	Hussein’s	Anfal	campaign	involving	chemical	weapons	attacks,	massacres,	sexual	violence,	and	mass	deportation	against	Kurdish	people	in	the	late	1980s.	The	description	of	Anfal	as	genocide	has	been	central	to	the	legitimacy	of	Kurdish	pursuit	of	statehood	and	independence	from	Iraq.56	By	labelling	the	IS	violence	against	the	Yezidis	as	another	genocide	victimizing	ethnic	Kurds,	the	Kurdish	authorities	sought	international	support	for	the	formation	of	an	independent	Kurdistan	where	religious	minorities	would	be	safe	from	extremist	violence.	The	KRG	authorities	organized	polling	stations	in	IDP	camps	and	strongly	urged	Yezidis	displaced	from	Sinjar	to	vote	in	the	referendum.57	In	this	regard,	the	recognition	of	Yezidi	victimhood	has	been	made	central		to	Kurdish	victimhood	and	pursuit	of	independence.		At	the	same	time,	the	failure	of	Kurdish	forces	to	protect	Yezidis	fostered	demands	for	the	formation	of	an	autonomous	region	for	religious	minorities	in	Nineveh	under	international	supervision.		For	instance,	Yazda,	one	of	the	most	well-known	Yezidi	humanitarian	and	lobbying	organizations,	explicitly	calls	for	such	autonomy.58	Similar	demands	were	also	put	forward	by	various	Christian	groups.59	A	final	transformation	following	the	IS	attacks	concerns	the	end	of	the	KRG	control	over	Sinjar.	While	the	KRG	forces	gained	back	parts	of	Sinjar	from	the	IS,	they	withdrew	
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completely	from	the	area	in	the	face	of	the	Iraqi	and	Shiite	militia	advances	in	October	2017.	As	a	result,	for	the	first	time,	a	Shiite	political	force	asserted	military	supremacy	over	Yezidis	lands	and	aimed	to	cultivate	its	own	patronage	networks	among	Yezidis	by	taking	advantage	of	intra-Yezidi	divisions.60	Besides,	the	PKK,	a		Kurdish	nationalist	force	with	a	history	of	rivalry	with	the	KDP,	made	significant	inroads	among	Yezidis	in	the	post-2014	period.61	During	the	attacks,	the	PKK	militants	played	a	highly	visible	role	in	opening	up	a	humanitarian	corridor	between	Mt.	Sinjar	and	the	Syrian	border	controlled	by	the	PYD,	a	PKK	affiliate.	This	corridor	enabled	desperate	Yezidis	who	took	refuge	in	Mt.	Sinjar	to	reach	safety.	The	PKK	established	a	permanent	presence	in	the	area	and	successfully	recruited	a	significant	number	of	Yezidi	men	and	women,	who	were	disenchanted	with	the	KDP,	to	its	militia.62	Like	the	KDP,	the	PKK	also	emphasizes	Kurdishness	of	Yezidis,	but	offers	a	distinct	ideological	alternative.	In	particular,	the	PKK	with	its	secular,	equalitarian,	and	gender	progressive	platforms	presented	itself	as	a	vehicle	of	empowerment	for	Yezidi	women	subject	to	extreme	levels	of	sexual	violence	and	patriarchal	practices.63		Moreover,	the	PYD	forces	rescued	many	kidnapped	Yezidi	women	and	children	from	the	IS	captivity	in	northeastern	Syria.	Building	on	a	blueprint	that	was	implemented	successfully	in	northern	Syria	(and	unsuccessfully	in	Kurdish	areas	of	Turkey),	the	PKK	declared	“democratic	autonomy”	for	Sinjar	and	sought	international	support.	The	rise	of	the	PKK	as	a	viable	force	vying	for	support	among	Yezidis	contributes	to	further	fragmentation	of	Yezidi	political	identity	and	complicates	the	formation	of	a	unified	stance	among	Yezidis	who	are	more	spread	out	than	ever	before.	
Gender	&	Politics	among	the	Yezidis	IS’s	attacks	against	the	Yezidis	revealed	once	again	the	centrality	of	gender	in	political	violence.	Indeed,	sexual	violence	has	been	used	as	a	deliberate	and	systematic	tool	to	commit	genocide	and	ethnic	cleansing	against	religious	and	ethnic	communities	in	many	other	contexts	in	recent	decades	as	well,	such	as	in	Bosnia,	Kosovo,	Rwanda,	Sudan,	Uganda	and	the	DRC.64	Groups	such	as	IS	use	specific,	typically	patriarchal,	gender	norms	in	intersection	with	identity	perceptions	towards	religious	or	ethnic	groups	to	justify	violence.65	The	precarious	position	of	the	Yazidi	minority	in	Iraq,	as	explained	earlier	in	the	chapter,	played	an	important	role	in	IS’s	targeting	of	this	community.	The	lawlessness	and	
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insecurity	created	by	sectarian	violence	in	Iraq	further	exacerbated	existing	discriminatory	attitudes	towards	the	Yezidis,	as	well	as	other	minority	communities.66		IS	explicitly	justified	its	gendered	violence	against	the	Yezidis	through	its	interpretation	of	certain	Islamic	rules	and	practices.	It	defined	the	Yezidis	as	a	“pagan”	minority	and	non-believers	and	treated	them	differently	from	members	of	other	religions	such	as	Christians.	According	to	IS	ideology,	Christians	and	Jews	are	considered	as	the	“People	of	the	Book”	who	can	be	treated	as	immune	from	certain	practices	during	war,	such	as	abducting	and	raping	female	members	of	these	communities.67	IS	believed	that	it	was	allowed	to	kill	male	members	of	the	Yezidi	community	if	they	do	not	convert	to	Islam,	and	to	abduct,	rape	and	sell	the	Yezidi	women	and	girls,	and	force	them	to	do	house	labor.68	After	their	capture,	the	Yezidi	women	and	children	were	shared	amongst	IS	fighters	that	participated	in	the	occupation	of	Sinjar	and	after	that	one	fifth	of	the	captives,	in	IS	terminology	‘slaves’,	were	transferred	to	the	IS	authorities	to	be	divided	as	‘profit’.69	Captured	Yezidi	women	and	girls	lived	under	circumstances	in	which	they	had	no	control,	and	they	were	entirely	stripped	off	their	ability	to	control	their	life,	body	and	dignity.			The	Yezidi	community’s	own	gender	norms,	especially	the	embodiment	of	men’s	and	families’	‘honor’	in	women’s	bodies,	made	these	attacks	particularly	unsettling		for	the	community.	Yezidis’	gender	norms	were	used	as	a	tool	by	IS	to	discourage	abducted	Yezidi	women	not	to	escape.	Yezidi	survivors	were	reported	to	say	that	their	captives	told	them	that	if	they	returned	to	their	communities,	they	would	be	killed,	referring	to	the	practice	of	‘honor’	killing,	or	would	not	be	accepted	back	home.70	The	Yezidis,	including	Yezidi	leaders,	consider	the	sexual	violence	perpetrated	by	IS	against	Yezidi	women	and	girls	as	an	attack	against	the	whole	of	the	community.	As	Mîr	Tehsîn	Seîd	Beg,	the	hereditary	leader	of	the	Yezidis	stated	the	Yezidis	could	have	maybe	reconciled	and	went	back	to	living	with	their	Arab	neighbors	even	after	killings;	but	IS’	treatment	of	thousands	of	Yezidi	women	and	girls	would	make	it	very	hard	to	reconcile.71	The	experiences	of	the	Yezidis	left	lasting	scars	for	the	community	and	led	to	extreme	levels	of	post-war	trauma	and	PTSD	.72		Sexual	and	other	forms	of	violence	experienced	by	the	Yezidis	cannot	be	treated	as	simply	an	outcome	of	IS’s	extreme	methods	or	the	result	of	conflict.	There	is	a	wider	context	of	inequality	and	structures	in	place	that	made	such	violence	thinkable	and	feasible.	Interviews	with	members	of	the	Yezidi	community	suggest	that	the	community	is	
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aware	of	these	wider	circumstances.	They	associate	their	experiences	of	violence	and	sexual	violence	to	the	long-term	disadvantages	of	being	a	minority	group	in	the	disputed	territories	in	Iraq	and	the	historical	prejudices	against	their	community.	Like	many	other	minority	communities	in	Iraq,	a	large	section	of	the	Yezidi	community	is	located	in	disputed	territories	(between	the	Kurdish	regional	government	and	the	Iraqi	government),	Being	in	this	location	puts	them	in	a	precarious	position	because	these	areas	are	typically	neglected	in	terms	of	infrastructure,	economic	investment	and	provision	of	security	and	protection.	Moreover,	the	history	of	religious	prejudice	against	the	community	and	the	distrust	between	Yezidis	and	Iraqi	and	Kurdish	have	exacerbated	the	precariousness	of	their	position.	Gender	norms	also	played	a	key	role	in	these	outcomes.	The	idea	that	women	can	be	bought	and	sought	for	sexual	purposes	like	a	commodity	and	that	they	can	be	entirely	stripped	off	their	agency	is	a	clear	example	of	this.	This	extreme	form	of	discrimination	and	violence	practiced	against	Yezidi	women	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	continuum	of	wider	discriminative	practices	and	violences	perpetrated	against	women	in	Iraq	in	general.73			Yet,	alongside	this,	the	community’s	experience	of	gendered	violence	by	IS	has	had	a	transformative	impact	on	the	political	and	social	life	among	the	Yezidi	community.	These	impacts	can	be	analyzed	in	three	interrelated	aspects.	First,	IS’s	attacks	and	its	violence	against	Yezidi	women	had	significant	effect	on	Yezidi	attitudes	about	survivors	of	sexual	violence.	Female	survivors	who	were	held	captive	by	IS	and	exposed	to	sexual	and	other	forms	of	violence	were	initially	hesitant	about	returning	to	their	families	and	communities.	They	feared	they	would	be	rejected	or	killed	for	“tainting”	the	“honor”	of	the	family.74	With	the	February	2015	Declaration	by	the	Yazidi	religious	authorities,	survivor	women	as	well	as	women	and	men	who	were	forced	to	convert	to	Islam	were	re-accepted	to	the	community.	After	this	declaration,	number	of	women	and	girls	returning	to	their	community	increased.	However,	this	does	not	mean	stigma	around	being	sexually	assaulted	have	disappeared	and	life	after	return	has	been	easy	for	returnees.	Moreover,	many	of	these	women	and	girls	continue	to	live	with	untreated	trauma	and	in	difficult	conditions	of	displacement	away	from	their	homes.	Some	of	these	women	have	migrated	to	European	countries	and	experiencing	other	difficulties	such	as	being	away	from	home	and	family,	and	
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adjusting	to	life	in	a	different	culture.75	Finally,	the	situation	of	children	born	to	Yezidi	women	raped	by	their	IS	captors	is	a	particularly	challenging	issue.76	Another	significant	impact	of	sexual	violence	against	Yezidi	women	and	girls	is	that	taboos	around	talking	about	sexual	violence	in	the	Yezidi	community	has	weakened	after	this	experience.	Generally,	sexual	violence	is	considered	as	a	difficult	issue	to	make	public	and	acknowledge	in	most	societies,	as	previous	cases	of	sexual	violence	in	armed	conflicts	across	the	world	showed.77	There	has	been	a	public	silence	about	the	experiences	of	Kurdish	women	sexually	assaulted	during	the	Anfal	campaign.78	In	sharp	contrast,	sexual	violence	has	become	part	of	the	public	discourse	and	Yezidis	integrated	it	into	their	communication	with	outsiders	and	Iraqi	and	Kurdish	authorities	to	explain	their	situation,	request	support	and	express	their	needs	and	demands.	Male	community	leaders,	and	brothers,	fathers	and	husbands	of	survivors	of	sexual	violence	have	openly	discussed	the	issue.	This	is	an	interesting	development	because	rather	than	shying	away	from	it,	Yezidis	are	openly	talking	about	sexual	violence	in	national	and	international	platforms.	Nadia	Murad,	a	Yezidi	sexual	violence	survivor	herself,	is	seen	as	a	spokesperson	for	communicating	Yezidis’	experiences	and	needs,	and	demand	justice	and	protection	for	her	community.	These	novel	developments	are	unprecedented	in	the	history	of	the	Yezidi	community.		Finally,	there	are	indicators	of	changing	perceptions	about	women’s	role	and	position	in	society	among	the	Yezidi	community.	This	is	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	experience	of	genocide	and	sexual	violence	made	the	community	once	again	realize	that	their	position	as	a	community	in	Iraq	is	precarious.	They	do	not	have	the	necessary	support	political	and	economic	structures	and	protection	mechanisms.	Therefore,	some	of	the	community	members	believe	that	empowering	girls	through	enabling	them	to	access	to	education	and	jobs	can	provide	them	some	form	of	protection.	A	number	of	interviewees	said	that	if	their	people	in	Sinjar	were	more	educated	and	more	aware	of	their	life	outside	their	communities,	the	genocide	against	their	community	would	not	have	happened.79	The	second	factor	that	contributed	to	changing	perceptions	about	women’s	position	is	displacement.	Displaced	Sinjari	Yezidis	in	Sheikhan	and	Duhok	were	able	to	meet	with	Yezidis	living	in	these	areas	and	interact	with	members	of	the	Yezidi	diaspora.	Yezidis	in	Sinjar	have	generally	more	conservative	norms	about	women’s	position	in	society	
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compared	to	Yezidis	in	the	Duhok	region	that	have	been	under	Kurdish	rule.	After	the	attacks,	several	educated	and	experienced	local	Yezidi	women	in	Duhok	and	Sheikhan	began	to	work	with	women’s	rights	organizations	and	humanitarian	organizations	to	provide	support	for	surviving	and	displaced	Sinjari	Yezidis	and	met	and	worked	with	them.	One	of	the	interviewed	humanitarian	NGO	workers,	who	is	a	Yezidi	herself,	said	“the	Shingali80	women	were	initially	reluctant	but	then	started	to	participate	in	training	and	even	started	working.”	She	attributed	this	partly	to	the	exposition	of	the	more	conservative	Sinjari	Yezidi	communities	to	the	more	open	life	of	the	Yezidis	in	Duhok:	“the	Shingali	community	became	more	open	towards	women	because	they	saw	other	Yazidi	women,	like	those	from	Sharia.	They	saw	that	their	women	are	open,	they	go	to	work,	they	go	to	school,	so	they	thought	to	be	a	little	bit	more	open	with	their	women	as	well.”81	
Conclusion		The	general	feeling	of	insecurity	characterizing	post-Saddam	Iraq,	the	rise	of	Sunni	extremism,	the	conflict	between	the	KRG	and	Iraqi	central	government	involving	Yezidi	lands,	and	the	further	fragmentation	of	the	community	via	migrations	and	forced	displacements	have	made	it	increasingly	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	for	Yezidis	to	seek	political	accommodation	as	a	non-assertive	minority	group.	The	genocidal	attacks	in	2014	has	strongly	reinforced	this	trend	and	contributed	a	proliferation	of	voices	and	platforms	about	distinctive	Yezidi	identity	at	local,	national,	and	international	levels.	In	this	regard,	Yezidis	are	latecomers	to	the	global	politics	of	recognition	challenging	allegedly	difference-blind	policies	and	demanding	dignity	for	particular	group	identities.82		The	Yezidi	politics	of	recognition	represents	a	major	change	in	the	community’s	self-identification	and	representation	given	the	long	history	of	Yezidis	as	a	liminal	community	lacking	official	recognition	during	the	Ottoman	times	and	widespread	prejudices	about	their	belief	systems	persisting	until	now.	It	entails	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	distinctive	nature	of	Yezidi	identity	and	history,	and	a	request	for	accountability	of	the	crimes	committed	against	Yezidis	informed	by	discourses	of	transitional	justice	and	feminism.	This	request	for	recognition	also	entails	a	strong	gender	dimension.	The	traumatic	experience	of	systematic	sexual	violence	pushed	the	community	to	question	gender-related	taboos	and	norms	and	women’s	position	in	private	and	public	life,	and	to	initiate	some	changes.	In	
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their	demands	for	protection	and	recognition,	Yezidi	advocacy	groups	and	activists	have	explicitly	incorporated	Yezidi	women,	gender	dimension	and	sexual	violence.	All	these	have	led	to	significant	symbolic	gains	that	elevated	Yezidis	from	an	obscure	minority	into	an	internationally	recognized	religious	minority	suffering	from	crimes	against	humanity	and	deserving	respect	and	protection.		Ironically,	this	rise	of	autonomous	Yezidi	politics	is	accompanied	with	an	increasing	communal	fragmentation	and	dispersion	and,	an	involvement	of	an	even	greater	number	of	external	actors	in	Yezidi	affairs.	The	post-war	conditions	in	Sinjar	remain	prohibitive	for	the	revitalization	of	the	Yezidi	life	there;	geopolitical	rivalries	involving	multiple	local	and	regional	forces	make	the	formation	of	an	autonomous	zone	for	Yezidis	highly	implausible.	Under	these	circumstances,	one	can	expect	that	Yezidi	diaspora	would	increasingly	play	a	more	important	role	in	sustaining	Yezidi	collective	identity,	shaping	its	global	image,	and	transforming	relations	within	the	community.				
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